Russia’s military intelligence service, or GRU, has been accused of running a secretive pipeline of operatives throughout Europe. During the last two years, government officials have arrested at least 75 people. They go on to allege that these individuals are being used as foot soldiers in Russia’s long-running war against the West. This campaign looks more like a well-planned, professional attack against European stability through sabotage and psychological warfare.
Polish authorities have singled out a senior officer of the GRU as the architect of this complex web. These operations as so far recounted have been characterized by Piotr Krawczyk, the former head of Poland’s foreign intelligence service, as “the classic psy-ops. This review draws attention to the strategy’s clever emphasis on not just physical sabotage but more importantly, on shaping public narrative and morale.
This is a remarkable and courageous assertion from the young Belarusian woman, which has landed in the headlines. She and her colleagues firmly reiterated that they oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He was doing this just so he could make money for us, because I was spending too much. He simply sought a little more spending money,” she explained. He took no thought to the future, which is often the driving force behind much of those who participate.
Polish authorities have linked the sabotage attempts to several arson attacks across Poland. One of these huge incidents even razed one of the biggest shopping malls in Warsaw to the ground. In Latvia, an Ikea store went up in flames as well. At the same time, other developments in Britain have received media attention — in particular, that seven people were charged with an arson attack on a Ukrainian-connected business. In France, activists dropped five coffins labeled “French soldiers in Ukraine” under the Eiffel Tower. At the same time, Estonian officials were facing the personal intimidation of vandalized car windows.
Much of that work has been spearheaded by a man known only as “Andrei” who has been directing these sabotage operations. His guidance was said to have spread through group members, each of whom had the job of distributing assignments to their classmates. Most of them come from unit 29155, notorious for its role in sabotage campaigns for more than a decade.
The methods used to recruit these operatives are deeply troubling, too. Many individuals are enlisted through grey employment groups—common venues where immigrants seek casual gig-economy work that often pays under the table. Other recruits continue to have clear ideological attachments to Russia, like this incorrigible Serhiy who is on the record for supporting the war against Ukraine. Usually recruitment takes place on trips to Russia, and then conversing on Telegram after instead of first reaching out.
A Telegram group with 28 subscribers promoting white supremacist content recently posted a message stating: “We are looking for partisans in Europe.” This further underscores the alarming intersection of extremism and espionage in the GRU’s tactics.
Senior European security officials have in turn raised the alarm about the broader implications of these operations. One official noted, “It’s easier to deal with spies under diplomatic cover or even [deep-cover] illegals.” Another remarked on the growing danger posed by such actions: “This kind of action is becoming dangerous for all of us.”
One of their points underscored the psychological nature of the campaign. “And it produces a sort of haze,” one explained, echoing fears about the public misunderstanding the difference between security and safety. They noted that even when an incident at first appears purely incidental, answers lead to patterns that raise red flags and start to look shady.
Judge Marcin Myczkowski highlighted the broader objectives of those accused: “The goal of the accused was to lower our morale, to question the effectiveness and competency of our state, and to question our support for Ukraine.” This declaration–the first of its kind in the world–highlights the deliberate, forward-looking strategy driving these moves.
Harrys Puusepp, head of bureau at Kapo, Estonia’s internal security agency, differentiated these operatives from traditional terrorist groups: “Their goal is not the same as Islamist jihadists who want as many victims as possible. If someone dies, they don’t care.” He further added that for many involved, motivations extend beyond ideology into realms of survival and financial gain: “It’s not a question of ideology but of business and relatives inside Russia.”
With these investigations still unfolding, there is increasing alarm about the GRU’s ability to target and manipulate at-risk populations throughout Europe. A former US security official commented on uncertainty surrounding these operations: “We didn’t know if Putin had approved it or knew about it.”