The recent fire aboard the Kildin, a 55-year-old Russian spy ship, has raised serious concerns about the state of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. The incident occurred off the Syrian coast last Thursday and marks yet another example of the fleet's ongoing maintenance and readiness issues. Experts emphasize that the Kildin is not an isolated case; two other vessels, the Ivan Gren and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky, have also experienced similar incidents, suggesting a systemic problem within the Russian naval operations.
Historically, the Russian navy has faced significant challenges regarding maintenance and operational readiness. Michael Kofman, a respected analyst, notes, “The Russian navy, post-Cold War, wasn’t really built for endurance.” This deficiency has made it increasingly difficult for the fleet to operate effectively over long distances, particularly in the Mediterranean, where its presence has become increasingly tenuous.
The Kildin was deployed in the eastern Mediterranean to monitor developments in Syria following the fall of Moscow's ally, Bashar al-Assad. After the fire broke out, the crew assembled on the aft deck and prepared lifeboats but did not request assistance. Following five hours of battling the flames, they managed to restart the ship's engines and resume operations. Such incidents reflect deeper issues; as Kofman points out, “Fires are not uncommon,” indicating a troubling trend that could lead to more severe operational failures.
Western sources describe the current state of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean as one of disrepair and disarray. The loss of the Tartus naval base in Syria would exacerbate these chronic problems, potentially leading to a full-blown crisis. Sidharth Kaushal warns that “this is, and always has been, an issue for the Russians,” emphasizing that the ramifications would be even more pronounced should they lose access to Tartus.
Moscow is actively exploring alternative bases in the region, but these options come with their own set of complications. A proposed Russian base in Libya appears to be the most viable alternative to Tartus. However, this would place Russia's Mediterranean fleet at the mercy of Libyan General Khalifa Haftar and his future alliances. Additionally, Algeria, a traditional ally of Russia, has grown wary due to Moscow's activities in Mali, further complicating Russia's strategic positioning in North Africa.
Efforts to secure a foothold in Sudan have also faltered. Negotiations for access through the Suez Canal have stalled, highlighting another layer of difficulty for Moscow's ambitions in the Mediterranean. As operations continue to stretch an aging fleet thin, the lack of sufficient maintenance and support facilities becomes increasingly problematic.
Kofman asserts that “they built smaller vessels that they could build more rapidly, and packed them very heavily with missiles.” While this strategy may serve defensive purposes near home waters, it significantly intensifies maintenance challenges for operations over longer distances.
As Moscow grapples with these pressing issues, it has begun relocating military equipment from Tartus. The HTS group recently annulled a contract with a Russian company that previously allowed it control over the commercial port at Tartus, a key element in Russia’s plan to establish a $500 million hub for exporting agricultural products. This development further diminishes Russia's strategic options in the region.