Brinkmanship over Iran’s nuclear ambitions has Washington and the world’s major powers on edge. Here in the US, we’ve been watching the run up to this moment for many years. Mistakes still plague the U.S. intelligence community. Even as it continues to enrich uranium, the U.S. report, each and every year, returns that Iran has not developed nuclear weapons. This grave diagnosis is grimly prescient, as this assessment has been largely unchanged since 2007. This relative stability is a double-edged sword that complicates diplomacy and military planning.
In many ways, Tehran’s sensitive uranium enrichment program is a centerpiece of the debate around Iran’s nuclear program. The program, established for peaceful purposes decades ago, has supposedly been “modernized” and may now be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. Iran did stop its weaponization program back in 2003. Since then, the country has conducted no bomb-related research and development. Analysts contend that the Iranian regime considers itself better off by maintaining the ambiguity of having such a capability. They insist that this approach is better than a more aggressive push for nuclear development.
Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has jumped to record amounts. Even Tulsi Gabbard, last director of national intelligence, warned about this insidious change back in March. This expansion has led to renewed discussions about what Iran’s enrichment activities mean. Many argue that the distinction between enrichment and weaponization doesn’t matter. Israeli officials and hardline supporters on Iran insist that if the decision to build a bomb was made, it could do so in short order.
The U.S. intelligence community’s assessments on Iran’s nuclear program have influenced the actions of successive presidents, including George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. These assessments have functioned as a brake on interventionist or hawkish policy actions. For instance, in 2010, a finding indicated that Iran could still develop a bomb, despite the absence of any ongoing weapons program since 2003. This nuance has colored U.S. policy towards Iran for decades.
The 2007 NIE was truly a turning point in chronicling Iran’s nuclear intentions. The report found that Iran’s civilian nuclear fuel cycle—specifically, its enrichment program—did not constitute evidence of a current nuclear weapons program. Yet, this report represented a huge shift from the expectations set in the past for Iran’s nuclear program.
The 2011 NIE made a difference. It did a poor job distinguishing between Iran’s peaceful and legitimate uranium enrichment for commercial purposes versus its weapons or military development. This lack of clarity has caused concern and confusion among advocates, carriers, shippers and other stakeholders. They fear that Iran will use its enrichment R&D to further its nuclear weapons program.
Fortunately, U.S. intelligence officials are confident in their ability to detect Iran’s bomb construction efforts at the first stages. They are constantly watching even when the fears of everybody else are at bay. This assurance is critical for policymakers as they navigate the delicate balance between containment strategies and diplomatic engagement with Tehran.
Former President Donald Trump’s administration adopted an increasingly hawkish position on Iran, up to and including advocating orders to strike Iran’s nuclear sites. These new military threats have further complicated an already fraught relationship. Critics contend that these steps increased tensions without adequately defending U.S. interests by addressing the root issues related to Iran’s nuclear program.
The continued debate over Iran’s nascent military nuclear program highlights the wider geopolitical ramifications for the Middle East and the world. Although international negotiations continue, it is still critically important for U.S. negotiators—and all stakeholders—to understand the difference between enrichment activities and bomb production capabilities.