In the 1970s, Israeli intelligence, working in concert with Western security services, conducted a secret hoax. Taken together, they proved important enablers of Israel’s targeted assassination campaign against Palestinian militants. Israel’s main foreign intelligence service, Mossad, largely ran this covert operation. It was driven in large part by the horrific events at the Munich Olympic Games this past September 1972, when Palestinian terrorists murdered eleven Israeli athletes.
The campaign escalated further when security agencies from the West provided significant evidence. They learned that a 38-year-old translator had been supplying arms and logistical support to the Black September Organization (BSO). The identity of the translator remains a mystery. The escalation and depth of the intelligence sharing in this case truly transformed the era’s counter-terrorism capabilities.
As a result, in 1971, the Kilowatt cables network was born. It had been established to share key strategic intelligence between 18 members Western intelligence services—most notably, the British, American, French, Swiss, Italian, and West German intelligence services. This network galvanized the circulation of critical information. Specifically, it assisted Mossad in locating and assassinating people believed involved in terrorism against Western Europeans.
Among those targeted was Mohamed Boudia, a celebrated veteran of the Algerian war of independence. Swiss intelligence officials had passed on vital information on the unique make of Boudia’s vehicle to Mossad. They discovered this during a raid on a safe house in Geneva. An Israeli assassination squad then followed Boudia’s movements and eliminated him by detonating a land mine in the street of a crowded Paris neighborhood.
Just weeks after the Munich attack, the Mossad hit again. They executed Wael Zwaiter in the lobby of his apartment building in Rome. The campaign stepped up with the assassination of Mahmoud al-Hamshari. He served as the official representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in France and was assassinated in Paris in December 1972. The Kilowatt cables painted a picture of Hamshari engaged in high-level diplomatic and fundraising efforts, all while he was ostensibly recruiting for terrorist cells.
Golda Meir, then-Prime Minister of Israel, insisted that Mossad provide ironclad evidence. She sought undisputed direct evidence linking its objectives to the Munich assault or the broader violence perpetrated by Palestinian armed factions. In making this demand, the IDF showcased the complicated interplay between political accountability to Israel’s right-wing government and operational efficacy.
In Mossad’s defence, in July 1973 the agency thought it had tracked down Ali Hassan Salameh, one of the main operatives within BSO, in Lillehammer, Norway. By utilizing an aerial photograph provided by MI5, British intelligence, Mossad was able to verify Salameh’s location. Then in June 1973, BSO and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) took out another major logistician of their terrorism. Swiss authorities were crucial to making this operation possible in Paris.
The depth of Western engagement in these operations has resulted in contentious discussions between experts on proper intelligence-sharing procedures. Guttmann, an analyst with deep knowledge of this partnership, was specific about the level of detail that is shared.
“A lot was very granular, linking individuals to specific attacks and giving details that would be of great help. Perhaps at the very beginning, [Western officials] were unaware [of the killings] but afterwards there was a lot of press reporting and other evidence suggesting strongly what the Israelis were doing,” – Guttmann.
He noted that intelligence agencies from the United States and other Western powers are currently feeding information directly to Mossad. They’re releasing results from their investigations into specific assassinations.
“They were even sharing the results of their own investigations into the assassinations with the agency – Mossad – which was most likely to have done them.” – Guttmann.
The unregulated nature of international intelligence-sharing is particularly troubling, as there are no public laws or regulations that provide oversight or accountability. Guttmann emphasized this challenge, stating:
“When it comes to intelligence-sharing between services of different states, oversight is very difficult. International relations of the secret state are completely off the radar of politicians, parliaments or the public. Even today there will be a lot of information being shared about which we know absolutely nothing,” – Guttmann.
He too highlighted Israel’s unprecedented campaign of extrajudicial assassinations of Palestinian leaders and questioned how it might have been carried out without this tactical information.
“I’m not sure the Israeli [assassination] campaign would have been possible without the tactical information from the European intelligence services. Certainly, it was of huge benefit. But it was also very important for the Mossad to know that they had that tacit support,” – Guttmann.